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ABSTRACT
State regulation of insurance companies has been criticized for many years
because of the burden imposed on insurers by having to comply with the laws of many
jurisdictions. These higher costs are passed on to consumers. The problems with the
current regulatory structure are prompting calls for increased federal regulation of
insurance. However, all proposals to federalize insurance regulation create opportunities
for abuse at the hands of the federal government and fail to utilize the benefits of a
federal system. This article shows how many of the problems of the current system can
be addressed without resorting to a large scale intrusion of federal regulators into
insurance markets. The proposed solution calls for minimal federal intervention to
provide for jurisdictional competition between states that would be allowed to charter
insurers that could operate nationally with only the single license granted by the charter.
This single-license approach addresses the most salient concerns of proponents of federal
optional chartering. It also has the potential for triggering competition and innovation in
insurance products and rates while preserving a meaningful role for state regulation.
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Butler & Ribstein
State regulation of insurance companies has been criticized for many years. 1
Many criticisms reflect the views of the insurance industry that inconsistent state
regulations drive up costs because of the burden of compliance with multiple
jurisdictions, limit product innovation and competition, and prevent companies from
exiting jurisdictions that impose burdensome regulation. Under the current regulatory
system, each state government is the monopoly insurance regulator within the state.
Although the states exchange information through the National Association of Insurance
Commissioners, state regulators' willingness and ability to experiment is constrained by
Thus, despite its
the threat that the experiments might attract federal regulation.2
appearance of being decentralized federalism, the current state-based regulatory system
does not capture the benefits of jurisdictional competition that are found in other areas of
the law, notably including corporate law. 3
The problems with state regulation and concerns about the competitiveness of
U.S. insurers in global financial markets have led to pressure for a greater federal role in
insurance regulation. 4 Several proposals to federalize insurance regulation have been
advanced. 5 The most seriously considered proposal calls for optional federal chartering
(OFC) of multi-state insurers. 6 Although OFC was recently endorsed by the U.S.
Department of Treasury, 7 the insurance industry is divided in its support of OFC. 8 All
proposals to federalize insurance regulation share the defect of the current system of
failing to take advantage of jurisdictional competition to generate a more efficient
regulatory structure.
This article shows how many of the problems of the current system can be
addressed without resorting to a large scale intrusion of federal regulators into insurance
1

See Peter J. Wallison, Introduction, in OPTIONAL FEDERAL CHARTERING AND THE
REGULATION OF INSURANCE COMPANIES (Peter J. Wallison, ed., 2000) (hereinafter Wallison).
2

See Scott E. Harrington, The History of Federal Involvement in Insurance Regulation, in
Wallison, supra note 1, 27-37; Bert Ely, The Fate of the State Guaranty Funds after the Advent of Federal
Insurance Chartering, in Wallison, supra note 1, 135, 138.
3 See Roberta Romano, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW (1993).
4 See Robert C. Eager, Creating Federal Insurance Regulation: A Zero-Based Approach, in
Wallison, supra note 1, 153, 153 (“… the growing sense that a federal platform for insurance is needed for
competitive reasons in a national – indeed, international—marketplace.”).
5

For a summary of current proposals to federalize insurance regulation, see Elizabeth F. Brown,
The Fatal Flaw of Proposals to Federalize Insurance Regulation, available on SSRN. Paper Presented at
Northwestern University School of Law’s Searle Center Research Symposium on Insurance Markets and
Regulation, April 14 and 15, 2008.
6

See Hal S. Scott, Optional Federal Chartering of Insurance: Design of a Regulatory Structure,
Harvard Law School Public Law Research Paper No. 07-05, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=985579.
Paper Presented at Northwestern University School of Law’s Searle Center Research Symposium on
Insurance Markets and Regulation, April 14 and 15, 2008.
7 The Department of The Treasury, Blueprint For a Modernized Financial Regulatory Structure
(March 2008).
8

Jeffrey H. Birnbaum, Insurers Are At Odds Over Paulson Plan: New Federal Overseer Favored
Mainly by Large Companies, THE WASHINGTON POST, Saturday, April 19, 2008; Page D01.
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markets. The proposed solution calls for minimal federal intervention to provide for
jurisdictional competition between states that would be allowed to charter insurers that
could operate nationally with only the single license granted by the charter. The singlelicense solution has the potential for triggering competition and innovation on insurance
products and rates while preserving a role for meaningful state regulation.
Discussion proceeds as follows. Part I provides a brief introduction to the
rationale for insurance and history of insurance regulation and the criticisms of the
current regulatory structure that have led to calls for federal intervention.
Part II evaluates current proposals for federal involvement in insurance
regulation. In general, it shows that the promise of short-term cost savings could lead to
long-term inefficiency both in the static sense of misguided regulation and the dynamic
sense of the opportunity costs of forgoing the advantages of a competitive regulatory
system.
Part III proposes a jurisdictional competition approach to insurance regulation.
Under the single-license proposal, states would be allowed to charter insurance
companies that would be licensed to operate nationally. Our proposal is based on letting
firms choose their state regulator, which would facilitate jurisdictional competition
without either the impediment of a federal competitor or exposing insurers to multiple
regulators. Insurers could choose their chartering state, subject to federal minimum
standards based on a market test for solvency. They could also choose their preferred law
to govern application and validity of their insurance policies, subject to limited state
ability to override by legislation the application of the chartering state's law. The singlelicense approach would permit a dynamic process for experimentation and improvement
of insurance regulation that would improve the international competitiveness of
American insurers, while at the same time ensuring the financial soundness of insurers
and preserving a limited state ability to protect consumers. The proposal calls for federal
intervention only to the extent of ensuring that states allow nationwide operations with a
single license, as well as allocation of taxing authority between the chartering state and
the state of the insured.
Part IV considers the potential for a residual federal role in providing substantive
regulation. The federal government might mitigate any remaining possibility of a race to
the bottom under the single-license approach, as well as protecting insurers from the
threat of multiple state regulations. However, any federal substantive regulation must be
designed not to unduly undercut the benefits of viable state competition.

I. THE CURRENT REGULATORY STRUCTURE
An understanding of the history and underlying economics of insurance regulation
is essential to considering the direction this regulation should take. This Part considers
the rationale for regulation of insurance, what explains the current regulatory structure,
and the problems with the current system.
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A. WHY REGULATE INSURANCE?
Insurance regulation has two broad and intertwined functions – protection of
consumers from unfair insurance contracts, and ensuring the safety and soundness of the
companies themselves. 9
An important basis of consumer protection is the supposed information
asymmetry between unsophisticated consumers and insurance companies. Insurance
policies are classic adhesion-type contracts presented to consumers with little or no
opportunity for bargaining over the terms. They are presented in arcane language that
consumers that even many lawyers have difficulty understanding. It is accordingly
difficulty or impossible for an individual consumer to meaningfully compare policies.
This is complicated by the peculiarly contingent nature of insurance that seems to justify
regulation. Consumers pay up front for the insurance company’s performance – coverage
against risk – that is contingent on the occurrence of an often distant and unlikely event.
Consumers may be unable to evaluate at the time they buy the policy their coverage for
the risk that eventually occurs. As a result, insurers have an incentive to overcharge for
what turns out to be rather narrow coverage.
Safety-and-soundness regulation involves the temporal nature of insurance that
triggers a concern that the insurance company will not be able to pay when it is called
upon to do so. Insurers have an incentive to charge low prices to attract customers in the
short run though this may increase the likelihood of default when the claims come due.
Thus, while consumer protection oriented regulators are worried about rates being too
high for the amount of coverage, safety-and-soundness regulators are concerned about
rates being too low to ensure the company will pay for covered risks.
An additional challenge inherent in safety-and-soundness regulation concerns the
link between this regulation and state guaranty funds that protect consumers by giving
them a source of funds when insurers default. These funds create a moral hazard by
potentially reducing the insurance industry's incentive to guard against default. Thus, as
with federal deposit insurance, the existence of these state funds must be tied to state
regulation of financial solvency.
Despite these problems for consumers, there are significant arguments against
strict regulation. Many insurers sell their products in a vibrant competitive market. Even
if many individual consumers do not have the time or expertise to track solvency or
figure out policies, some do, and the size of the market justifies the entry of expert
intermediaries. Moreover, insurers' emphasis on standard-form contracts and pricing
makes price discrimination difficult. Accordingly, competition gives insurers an
incentive to offer terms acceptable to the more sophisticated buyers. 10
Insurance, of course, is not the only financial service subject to regulation.
Banking and securities are regulated as well. Insurance arguably differs from other
9

See generally Scott Harrington, Federal Chartering of Insurance Companies: Options and
Alternative for Transforming Insurance Regulation, Policy Brief, Networks Financial Institute at Indiana
State University, 2006-PB-02 (March 2006).
10

See Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis of Imperfect
Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 630 (1979).

5

A Single-License Approach to Regulating Insurance
financial services on several dimensions. However, while we can define the current
industry, there may be no economic reason for these borders to persist. For example,
consumers can protect against risks by investing as well as by insuring. An important
goal of insurance regulatory reform could be to set up an institutional framework that
allows financial markets and products to evolve in response to market forces.
B. THE STRUCTURE OF INSURANCE REGULATION
The tensions in the current regulatory structure have been present for at least 140
years. When insurance companies expanded across state lines during the middle of the
nineteenth century, they sought federal regulation to relieve them from the burdens of
complying with regulations in multiple jurisdictions. 11 U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in
Paul v. Virginia 12 halted this effort in 1868 by holding that insurance contracts were not
interstate commerce. However, the Supreme Court reversed course in 1944 in United
States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass’n 13 where it held that insurance was interstate
commerce and thus subject to federal antitrust regulation.
Though insurers favored a single federal regulator of insurance prior to Paul v.
Virginia, they changed their tune after South-Eastern Underwriters presented them with
the specter of federal antitrust regulation. Antitrust regulation threatens insurers' ability
to enhance actuarial projections by cooperating through rating bureaus on the collection
and dissemination of risk information. The insurance industry was anxious to remove the
potential antitrust threat but did not have enough clout to get the federal regulation it
wanted. They therefore joined with the state regulators through the National Association
of Insurance Commissioners (“NAIC”) to obtain passage of the McCarran-Ferguson Act
of 1945. 14 McCarran-Ferguson provided limited antitrust immunity for the insurance
industry 15 and established the states as the primary regulators of the insurance industry. 16
McCarran-Ferguson instituted an era of regulation through dispersed state
regulators, made somewhat palatable to insurers by state cooperation through the NAIC.
However, several insurer failures in the late 1980s and early 1990s cast doubt on the
adequacy of state guaranty funds and triggered renewed interest in federal regulation of
insurance. Congress considered several proposals for federal chartering and regulation
and the establishment of a federal guaranty fund. The NAIC successfully fended off this
incursion onto their turf by encouraging state regulators to enact their own risk-based
capital requirements for insurers, modeled after federal risk-based capital requirements

11

See Susan Randall, Insurance Regulation in the United States: Regulatory Federalism and the
National Association of Insurance Commissioners, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 625 (1999).
12

75 U.S. 169 (1868).

13

322 U.S. 533 (1944).

14

Ch. 20, §1, 59. Stat. 33 (1945)(codified 15 U.S.C.S. §1011 (2004)).

15

For a discussion and policy analysis of McCarran-Ferguson, see Jonathan R. Macey and
Geoffrey P. Miller, COSTLY POLICIES: STATE REGULATION AND ANTITRUST EXEMPTION IN
INSURANCE MARKETS (1993).
16

See U.S.C.S. §§1011-1015 (“the business of insurance, and every person engaged therein, shall
be subject to the laws of the several States which relate to the regulation and taxation of such business.”).
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for banks. However, the equilibrium may be shifting toward an increased emphasis on
federal regulation.
The adoption of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLB) is another significant
development. GLB blurs traditional boundaries while at the same time maintaining
existing formal distinctions in federal regulation of financial services. 17 This uneasy
situation increases the need for a system that erases artificial regulatory barriers.
C. ARGUMENTS FOR FEDERAL REGULATION
The whole idea of a state-based system for regulating insurance is now on the
table. This makes particularly salient the long-unsettled question of whether insurance
really should be regulated by the states. There are obvious scale economies in the sale of
insurance, particularly including the cost advantages of a large risk pool and of selling
standard-form policies. Insurance is, therefore, a national business, which seems to
require national regulation.
The interstate nature of the insurance business casts doubt on the viability of
state-based insurance regulation. Insurance companies operating in more than one state
must comply with regulation in each state in which they sell insurance. As long as states
have the power to bar firms from selling in their states, insurers must pay a regulatory tax
in order to enter state markets. This gives states – particularly those like California with
the most lucrative markets – the ability and incentive to impose inefficient regulation at
the behest of local interest groups.
The problems of state-based regulation of insurance are manifest. First, the idea
that each state should be regulating the prices insurers charge is highly questionable.
State regulators have incentives to suppress rates below the level that the market would
bear in order to satisfy consumer groups. Rate regulation is a particularly easy target for
proponents of federal preemption. 18
Second, insurers must get each state's regulatory approval of every policy they
sell. The process itself is costly, as is insurers' inability to rely on uniform policies across
the states in which they sell insurance. Among other things, states impose restrictions on
insurers' underwriting and risk classification, which undercuts insurers' need to rely on
national standards.
Third, states impose a variety of consumer-protection rules insurers must comply
with regardless of where the companies are chartered or based. Unlike many types of
contracts, insurance policies cannot effectively designate a single applicable law. Under
the most commonly applied test, a state can disregard the contractually designated state if
the designated law is "contrary to a fundamental policy of a state which has a materially

17

See Brown, supra note 5.

18 See Wallison, supra note 1, at 10 (“The problem of nonessential regulation suggests that there
could be significant compliance-cost reductions in a federal chartering and regulatory system, if the federal
authority were to reduce nonessential regulation and nonuniform state conduct regulation not beneficial to
the public.”).
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greater interest than the chosen state in the determination of the particular issue." 19 States
have considerable leeway in determining whether these conditions are met. 20
All of this could be ameliorated to some extent if insurers could exit states that
impose excessive burdens. To be sure, as noted above, this is not a panacea for insurers
since they would have to bear the penalty of losing sales in the state. But it would at least
give insurers a stick they could hold over regulators, since consumers in the state would
suffer from insurer exit. The problem is that states also bar the doors by imposing
restrictions on insurer exit – and they may impose these barriers only after the insurer has
entered the state. 21

II. A CRITIQUE OF FEDERAL REGULATORY REFORM PROPOSALS
This Part discusses proposals for a federal fix of the current system of insurance
regulation. Subpart A begins by sounding a general cautionary note about the advantages
of a federal regulatory system. Although such a system may yield short-term gains over
the current approach, it may well have long-term costs. The appropriate institutional
design is far more important than the substantive content of the regulation. The remainder
of this Part critiques the specific proposals that are on the table in light of these general
considerations.
A. THE FALSE PROMISE OF FEDERAL REGULATION
The economic case for federal insurance regulation appears overpowering in light
of the overreaching and inefficiency of the current state system. Calls for federal
regulation are motivated by a desire to relieve the problems of duplication and
overregulation that result from current allocation of regulation to the states. Indeed, the
calls for reform may have the even more short-term motivation of a justified fear of being
subject to aggressive regulators in states like Mississippi 22 and Florida. 23
However, in evaluating reform proposals it is easy to fall into the trap of
overemphasizing short-term benefits from federal regulation that would remove the
redundancies of the current state-based system. State regulation has important but
perhaps less apparent long-term dynamic benefits of creating an institutional structure
19

See Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws, §187(2) (1971).

20

See O'Hara & Ribstein, THE LAW MARKET, Ch. 3 (forthcoming Oxford Univ. Press).

21

See Richard A. Epstein, Exit Rights and Insurance Regulation: From Federalism to Takings, 7
GEO. MASON L. REV. 293 (1999).
22

In the wake of Hurricane Katrina, Mississippi Attorney General Jim Hood sought to prevent
State Farm Insurance Co. from “refusing to write new homeowners and commercial policies.” In February,
2007, Hood announced that he would seek new legislation premised upon Florida’s anti-cancellation
measures, but going one step further. His plan would force firms currently offering auto insurance in
Mississippi, and homeowners insurance in other states, to “write new policies” for homeowners insurance
in Mississippi. This move was made in response to State Farm’s announcement that “it has had enough of
the ‘untenable’ legal and political climate in the state and is suspending writing new homeowners and
commercial policies.” Associated Press, Miss. Official Seeks to Block State Farm, February 17, 2007,
available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/17187629/.
23 Tom Zucco, Allstate, Florida not backing off in insurance fight, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES,

Friday, April 18, 2008.
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that encourages experimentation and regulatory evolution in response to changes in
exogenous and endogenous forces. In particular, a state-based system facilitates reversal
of inevitable policy mistakes that can easily get locked in at the federal level. Consider,
for example, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, a hastily adopted law that brought increased
federalization of previously state-dominated corporation law. 24 Almost from the moment
of its enactment, Sarbanes-Oxley has caused huge costs and problems for publicly traded
firms. Yet there has still been no serious attempt to reform the legislation. Similarly,
federal controls on interest rates outlasted their usefulness to the point that they
bankrupted the entire savings and loan industry.
It is far from clear that a large federal role is necessary, even given the problems
of state regulation. The states have shown that they can respond to the need to modernize
regulation to enable firms to compete in a global market. 25 The major problem with the
current system of insurance regulation that needs to be fixed is that it turns what could be
the big advantage for the United States in the global market place – the "genius" of our
federal system – into a significant disadvantage, where domestic firms are crippled by
multiple state regulation and foreign firms are deterred from entering. Also, instead of
encouraging regulatory experimentation and competition, the NAIC stifles
experimentation by setting standards and model rules.
The objective in reforming insurance regulation should be to fix the problems of
state law without imposing the potential costs of federalizing insurance law.
Understanding the need to preserve the dynamism of our federal system is far more
important than trying to get the details of a regulatory fix exactly right for transitory
current market conditions. Our policy proposals in Part III deal with the problems of
state regulation without throwing the baby out with the bath water.
Large insurers may be skeptical of any approach that preserves state regulation.
They may be convinced that they could more effectively control federal legislators and
regulators than they can control legislators and regulators in fifty-one dispersed
jurisdictions. And state-based consumer protection groups may just want to maintain the
regulatory status quo. But federalization would introduce a new interest group dynamic
that existing groups might find difficult to control. Many state-based consumer groups
would be marginalized by a federal takeover of insurance regulation and replaced by new
and more aggressive proponents of regulation. Under true jurisdictional competition,
market forces could constrain and balance the often competing interests of insurers and
consumer protectors. By contrast, under a federal regime, insurers would be forced to
deal with a single legislature and perhaps a single regulatory agency. They would
therefore be vulnerable to repeated threats of regulation and attempts to extract rents, 26
with little ability to respond to the threat by exiting to another regime.
Reform proponents also tend to overestimate the likelihood that their favored
proposal will work as intended. The task of determining appropriate or optimal standards
24

See Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, THE SARBANES-OXLEY DEBACLE (AEI 2006).

25 See Harrington, supra note 2 at 27-37 (noting that periodic crises have forced individual states
and the NAIC to make gradual moves toward modernizing the regulatory system.).
26

See infra note 29 and accompanying text.
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under federal charters may appear simple and straightforward. After all, state regulators
and the NAIC have been promulgating rules and regulations for a long time. Law
professors and other experts may be so convinced they are right that they may find it
difficult to believe that smart, well intentioned federal regulators could reach a different
conclusion. However, reform of a complex system is immensely difficult to get right,
even under the highly unrealistic assumption that current conditions will not change. If
conditions do change, today's panacea will become tomorrow's problem. Meaningful
reform requires establishing a system that will reach the right solutions today and
tomorrow.
B. THE TREASURY PLAN AND THE NATIONAL INSURANCE ACT:
OPTIONAL FEDERAL CHARTERING
The recently-unveiled Treasury Plan is similar to the National Insurance Act of
2007 and other legislative proposals that create a federal optional charter. 27 For ease of
exposition, the following discussion focuses on the Treasury Plan. The Treasury Plan
would give multi-state insurance companies the option of obtaining a federal charter that
would allow them to operate throughout the country without regard to state licensing and
entry restrictions. The Treasury Plan would create a new Office of National Insurance
(“ONI”) within the Treasury Department which would be headed by a Commissioner of
National Insurance (“CNI”). The Treasury Plan would also establish an Office of
Insurance Oversight (“OIO”) to (1) address international regulatory issues and (2) advise
the Secretary on major domestic and international policy issues. Nationally chartered
insurers would be exempt from state rate regulations.
OFC proposals are premised on the assumption that national regulators will
provide more balanced and reasonable regulation than decentralized state regulators.
Supporters of OFC argue that establishing an optional federal charter would not supplant
state regulation or state premium taxation because OFC would allow insurers to choose
between state and federal regulation. 28
27 See Treasury Blueprint, supra note 7, at n. 110 (“Treasury recognizes that there are currently
pending bills in both the House (H.R. 3200) and Senate (S. 40) entitled ‘National Insurance Act of 2007’
that would create an OFC and establish an ONI. It is not Treasury’s intent at this time to opine on the
details or merits of the pending legislation, but rather to set forth general guidelines as to the basics that it
believes any ultimate legislation should contain in establishing an ONI and creating an OFC. That said,
there are many positive attributes to these bills as they address many of the concepts raised in this report.”).
28 The OFC approach is often analogized to the dual banking regulatory structure. See Eager,
supra note 4, at 154 (“Political reality dictates that a federal charter be optional and create a dual statefederal system. That is desirable because … there is a real virtue to a system that fosters competition
through choice. The dual banking system is a relevant model and on the whole demonstrates the
competitive and regulatory vitality of a dual system.”); U.S. Treasury Department of Public Affairs, Fact
Sheet: Treasury Releases Blueprint for a Stronger Regulatory Structure (March 2008) (“This structure is
similar to the current dual-chartering system for banking.”). This analogy, however, should not convince
anyone of the virtues of the optional charter. First, the virtues of the dual banking system are often
overstated. See Henry N. Butler & Jonathan R. Macey, The Myth of Competition in the Dual Banking
System, 73 Cornell L. Rev. 677 (1988). Second, the presence of federal deposit insurance (which is
available to both federal and state banks) dramatically distorts the type of market pressures that could be
created in a vibrant market for insurance charters. For a discussion of one limited area where the dual
banking system encouraged beneficial regulatory competition, see Henry N. Butler, The Competitive
Equality Doctrine and the Demise of Intrastate Branching Restrictions, 55 TENN. L. REV. 703 (1988).
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The central problem with OFC is that it preserves only the mirage of competition.
The NIA would let multi-state insurers either choose a single federal charter or continue
to be subject to multiple state regulators just as they are now. Given the high costs of the
state system, insurers would be highly likely to choose the federal charter. Thus, OFC is
likely to evolve into an all-federal system. Moreover, insurers would gain little from this
"choice," as federal politicians could engage in "rent extraction" by threatening regulation
up to the difference between the regulatory costs under the federal regime and those
under the state regime. 29 Thus, insurers could lose the benefit of the gains associated with
opting into federal regulation plus the transaction costs of resubmitting to licensing in
each state.
One might wonder why this is so, since it would seem that insurers would
recognize the risk of lock-in and rent extraction and just stay with the current system.
But the drawback of that strategy lies in the very problem that is provoking calls for
reform – the inadequacy of state funds. These funds provide a kind of product warranty,
akin to federal deposit insurance, that state regulators will provide adequate protection.
Thus, as Bert Ely has explained, "if government wants to be in the business, for whatever
reason, of regulating financial institutions, then it has no choice but to provide a warranty
for the service that business supposedly provides to the general public." 30 The problem is
that as long as consumers demand a warranty, they are likely to insist on the stronger
warranty the federal government can provide, particularly since the federal program may
draw funds from already weak state funds. This is supported by the fact that non-federal
deposit insurance almost completely disappeared in the wake of federal insurance. 31
Even apart from the federal government's deeper pocket, OFC might dominate the
current state-based system simply because of the defects of state law under the current
regime. Because each state regulatory body currently has a monopoly over the regulation
of insurance sold in that state, the states have had no incentive to compete to provide the
most efficient regulation. A new federal competitor could start out by offering regulation
that is superior to any state regulator. A few states might be able to quickly offer equal or
superior regulation, but they would have to be significantly better in order to beat the
deeper federal guaranty.
Thus, the fact that the market might ultimately accept federal chartering over state
law does not necessarily mean that it is the superior solution. The problem is that, due to
the federal government's deeper pocket and its exclusive opportunity to offer
jurisdictional choice, federal and state chartering will not be competing on an even
playing field. Even if insurers could choose a single state license or a federal license, this
would still not be a good market test because the states would still have to compete with a
deep-pocketed federal regulator. In any event, the need for a federal chartering option
ultimately depends on the quality of state regulation under jurisdictional competition.
29

See Fred S. McChesney, Rent Extraction and Rent Creation in the Economic Theory of
Regulation, 16 J. LEG. STUD. 101 (1987); R. Doernberg and Fred S. McChesney, Doing Good or Doing
Well? Congress and the Tax Reform Act of 1986, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 891 (1987).
30 Bert Ely, The Fate of the State Guaranty Funds after the Advent of Federal Insurance
Chartering, in Wallison, supra note 1, 135, 137-38.
31

Id. at 142.
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Under our proposal outlined in Part III, state competition would provide meaningful
competition and assurances of solvency. This arguably eliminates the need to force the
states into a one-sided competition with federal regulation and the solvency fund that
bonds that regulation. After considering the single-license alternative, we will return to
the optional chartering approach. 32
In short, although OPM is being sold as a system that provides insurers with real
choice, it does not actually deliver on this promise. OPM likely would lead to a system in
which there is only one regulator, the federal government. If choice is good, as the
proponents of OPM claim, 33 policymakers should focus on designing a system that
provides real choice. True choice may or may not involve the choice of a federal
charter. What is clear is that the current OPM proposal does not involve true choice.
C. SMART ACT: MINIMUM FEDERAL STANDARDS AND PREEMPTION
The State Modernization and Regulatory Transparency (SMART) Act would
effectively have the federal government establish minimum standards for many activities
currently regulated by the states, including rates, policy forms, insurer and producer
licensing, market conduct, surplus lines, reinsurance, solvency oversight, and
receivership of insolvent insurers.
It would create a National-State Insurance
Coordination Partnership. This agency would have seven commissioners – a chairman
nominated by the states and appointed by the President, three federal commissioners and
three state commissioners. The SMART Partnership would have no direct regulatory
authority, but a state's failure to follow NAIC model laws within three years of loss of
regulatory authority.
Although SMART is characterized as a federal-state “partnership” and is designed
to make it appear that it is not a federal takeover, federal law would preempt state rules
that fail to meet the federal minimum standards within specified periods. This constraint
on the evolution of state regulation effectively relegates SMART to a federal takeover of
regulation. The basic problem is that the federal government cannot set minimum
standards without ultimately coming to dominate the field. Where does the federal role
end and the state role begin? SMART's risk of federalization is even clearer than the risk
of potential federalization of corporation law in the earlier handiwork of one of SMART's
main legislative proponents – Representative Michael Oxley of Sarbanes-Oxley fame. At
least with the federal securities laws there is a boundary, albeit hazy, between disclosure
and substantive regulation. But with SMART, the federal government would be
regulating precisely in the same way as the states. The Supremacy Clause accordingly
would not limit the federal reach. 34
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See infra subpart IV.C.
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See Cantwell F. Muckenfuss III, Creating Federal Insurance Regulation: A Zero-Based
Approach, in Wallison, supra note 1, 161, 162 (“For proponents of the free market and the benefits of
competition, the case for a federal regulatory alternative should be overwhelming and, in fact, for many
years it has been overwhelming.”).
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D. INSURANCE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT: MANDATORY FEDERAL
CHARTERING AND CREATION OF FEDERAL INSURANCE REGULATION
The Insurance Consumer Protection Act of 2003 (“ICPA”) would subject all
multistate insurers to federal regulations. The newly-formed Insurance Regulatory
Commission, a division of the U.S. Department of Commerce, would regulate all lines of
insurance. All multistate insurers would be covered by a newly-formed National
Insurance Guaranty Corporation. The ICPA would, among other functions, provide for
consumer protection function, repeal McCarran-Ferguson, and eliminate the insurance
industry’s antitrust exemption. This proposal discards the apparent efficiency goal of the
above proposals for a naked political compromise – more consumer protection in
exchange for lower regulatory compliance costs.
E. COMPREHENSIVE RESTRUCTURING
SERVICES REGULATION

OF

FEDERAL

FINANCIAL

Professor Elizabeth Brown proposes a complete overhaul of federal financial
services regulation. 35 Professor Brown begins with a list of problems allegedly
associated with all the proposals to federalize insurance including creating a race-to-thebottom between federal and state agencies competing for insurer chartering business;
creating an uneven playing field between multistate and single state insurance companies;
confusing consumers about which regulators are responsible for regulating particular
companies; displacing state guaranty funds; and creating a massive new federal
bureaucracy. 36 Brown adds what she calls the "fatal flaw" of federal proposals – that
they do "not make sense when the market for financial services is a continuum, not a
series of discrete baskets.” 37
Brown proposes to merge the Securities and Exchange Commission and the
Commodities Futures Trading Commission into a super agency that would have
regulatory authority over the insurance industry as well. Brown argues that this new
federal agency would reflect the realities of the financial services marketplace in which it
is often difficult to distinguish where one product definition ends and another begins. 38
Although Brown correctly analyzes the fundamental changes in U.S. financial
services markets that are merging previously discrete markets, her prescription for a
consolidation of regulatory authority does not necessarily follow from this analysis.
Brown’s proposal would in effect put federal regulation on steroids by having one federal
agency regulate everything. This would not only eliminate "horizontal" jurisdictional
competition like the proposals discussed above, but also "vertical" competition among
regulatory agencies. This proposal exhibits a great deal of confidence in a single set of

35

See Brown, supra note 5.

36

Id at 39.

37

Id at 43.

38 Id at 2 (“If the United States is going to federalize insurance, it should adopt a structure that
recognizes the current realities of the financial services industry and not one that memorializes how the
industry operated a decade ago.” ). Brown models her proposal after the United Kingdom’s Financial
Services Agency.
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federal regulators to get it right and keep it right. Unfortunately, there is no mechanism
for correcting regulatory mistakes. 39
F. SUMMARY
Both theoretical considerations and a review of the current legislative proposals
for insurance reform suggest several institutional approaches to regulatory reform in this
area. The first is the current state-based system, which has resulted in significant costs
for insurers from opportunistic state regulators and courts and duplicative regulation. A
second option would be federalizing the system, which could fix the short-term problems
but prevent needed competition and experimentation. A third approach is a state-federal
partnership involving minimum federal standards. However, putting the camel's nose of
federal regulation under the tent likely will mean that the rest of the camel will soon
follow – that is, full federalization of insurance regulation. Fourth, the federal
government could become an optional chartering alternative. But, again, we have shown
how this "partnership" could lead to a "sole proprietorship" of federal regulation. The
next Part presents a proposal for real competitive federalism in insurance. Specifically,
we suggest permitting insurers to choose a single state regulator that would govern their
activities in all fifty states.

III. THE SINGLE-LICENSE SOLUTION
The states have had ample opportunities over the past half century to devise
institutional structures that encourage the evolution of modern insurance regulation.
Despite the current interest in federal legislation the state regulators seem content to
make only marginal changes in the way they conduct their business. As a result, there is
a widespread consensus that there are serious problems with the current state-based
regulatory system. Yet, as discussed above, there are good reasons to be skeptical of the
ability of federal regulators to get it right and keep it right. The tension reflected in these
observations suggests the need for a policy response that triggers the development of
meaningful jurisdictional competition while reducing the likelihood of immediate federal
domination that is likely under OFC.
An alternative to the federal domination that is likely to occur under OFC or the
other federalization of insurance proposals discussed above is to model federal insurance
regulation after corporate chartering which takes advantage of the “genius” of
jurisdictional competition. 40 Under the regulatory federalism of the corporate chartering
system, most internal governance is left to the chartering state, with a federal minimum
standard that takes the form of disclosure regulation. An analogous proposal for
insurance regulation would allow an insurer to be chartered in a primary state of their
choice, and then would be licensed to sell in any state provided the insurer met minimum

39

International competition in financial services could serve to constrain Brown’s federal
regulatory behemoth (should the behemoth allow such competition), but the true cost of such centralization
is that it would ruin any chance of taking advantage of the unique advantage that competitive federalism
can provide to enhancing the competiveness of U.S. firms.
40

See Romano, supra note 3.
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federal standards. 41 At one point, this single-license proposal had the support of the
insurance industry. 42
The single-license proposal is attractive because it captures both the static
efficiency benefits that would be expected from moving to a single regulatory and the
dynamic benefits of competitive regulatory federalism. However, unlike the proposals
discussed in Part II, there would be no overall federal regulation of insurance. Insurers
would get a single state charter under which they could do business everywhere. That
state would both regulate solvency and provide the relevant guaranty fund. With regard
to solvency regulation, the single-license system would not be much different from the
current system regarding insurer solvency regulation because states currently rely
primarily on the solvency regulation of the chartering (domiciliary) state. 43 There would
be no disjunction between state-chartered and federally-chartered firms, or the moral
hazard presented when the regulator and the keeper of the fund differ.
The single-license system would not require creating new entities or massive new
federal regulatory bodies. And because the federal government excluded itself from this
regulatory area by McCarran-Ferguson, there is no federal regulatory apparatus to
dismantle in order to institute effective state competition. The single-license approach
would, however, require federal legislation. The states have had 60 years since
McCarran-Ferguson to evolve toward jurisdictional competition and have instead
embraced a state cartel under NAIC. The statute might, for example, provide for federal
preemption except where states enforce choice of law clauses, thereby preserving state
autonomy as long as the states do not use their authority to disrupt interstate commerce.
Similarly, a federal law was necessary to establish chartering competition for captive
insurers. 44 Also, by analogy, the National Banking Act established a state choice of law
regime for interest rates. 45 However, we emphasize that the federal law we have in mind
is a federal choice-of-law rule rather than substantive regulation of insurance.
Subpart A discusses the importance of opening the national market for singlelicense firms by removing state regulatory impediments to entry and exit. Subpart B
discusses the important role that adjustments in the allocation of insurance tax revenues
can play in spurring effective jurisdictional competition under the single-license
approach. Subpart C discusses our proposal for market-based federal minimum
insolvency standards. Subpart D presents the second qualification of constrained state
mandatory consumer regulation.
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See Scott Harrington, Federal Chartering of Insurance Companies: Options and Alternative for
Transforming Insurance Regulation, Policy Brief, Networks Financial Institute at Indiana State University,
2006-PB-02 (March 2006).
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See Wallison, supra note 1, at 10.

44 See William J. Warfel, Insurance Regulatory Reform: An Evaluation of Options for Expanding
the Role of the Federal Government (forthcoming CPCU eJournal 2007), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=946457.
45

See 12 U.S.C. § 85.

15

A Single-License Approach to Regulating Insurance
A. REMOVING BARRIERS TO ENTRY AND EXIT
The jurisdictional competition approach to insurance regulation could, in theory,
evolve through reciprocal and multi-state agreements among states to recognize licenses
granted in other states. This has not happened, and it not obvious that it would ever
happen with the provincial nature of current state-based insurance regulation.
Accordingly, federal legislation mandating jurisdictional choice is necessary in
order to fashion state regulation into a meaningful alternative to intrusive federal
substantive regulation. Specifically, the federal statute should clearly authorize a state to
charter insurance companies that can operate in all other states, subject only to nondiscriminatory solvency regulation that the non-chartering state imposes on insurers
chartered in that state. This would enable consumers in every state to shop for insurance
from companies regardless of where they are chartered based on price, quality and type
of product.
In order for meaningful jurisdictional competition to occur as to any aspect of
insurance regulation, insurers must not only be able to select any chartering or regulating
state that is attractive to them, but also to exit states that change their regulation. The
main qualification on exit is that states need to be able to protect against a drain on
potential contributions to the state guaranty fund. Indeed, there are existing state
associations, the National Conference of Insurance Guaranty Funds for P&C insurers and
the National Organization of Life and Health Insurance Guarantee Associations
(NOLHGA), which protect against this risk. 46 These institutions suggest that states can
deal with this problem. The concern is that states might go further and, for example,
require insurers to pay a large exit fee if they wanted to reincorporate in another state.
Firms can protect themselves to some extent by refusing to enter states that impose such
restrictions. The danger is that states will impose these restrictions for the first time after
the insurer enters the state. 47 To protect against this risk, any federal choice-of-law or
chartering statute must include provisions designed to facilitate low-cost exit.
B. TAX INCENTIVES FOR JURISDICTIONAL COMPETITION
A robust market for insurance regulation requires that states have an incentive to
compete to provide such regulation. This incentive can be provided by properly
allocating state tax revenue from insurance sales. 48 The reallocation of insurance tax
revenues could play an important role in spurring the type of jurisdictional competition
proposed in this paper. However, it is unlikely that the states will agree on their own to
such a reallocation because many – perhaps most – states will be net losers under this
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See Ely, supra note 30 at 139.
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See Epstein, supra note 21.
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The need for this incentive indicates a further flaw in optional federal chartering. Proposed OFC
would not affect the current allocation of state tax revenues on the basis insured's state of residence. The
states accordingly would have little incentive to modify their insurance regulation in response to
competition from federal chartering. Supporters of OFC may have wanted to make their proposal more
palatable by not making it look like a federal revenue grab. And, to be sure, allocating revenue from
federal chartering to the federal government would have that effect. But the solution is to forego the
federal regulator rather than adding one on a basis that would further weaken state competition.
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system.
Accordingly, designing a federal jurisdictional choice statute requires
considering the appropriate allocation of state tax revenues.
The most straightforward allocation would be for the insurance tax revenue to go
to the chartering state of the insurance company that sells the policy. Because a
substantial amount of revenue is at stake, it seems likely that several states would be
willing to invest in creation of a regulatory environment that makes their state an
attractive primary state. Other states would have some incentive to keep up with
regulatory changes in other states in order to avoid losing revenues.
The problem with this straightforward proposal is that representatives from states
that expect to lose revenues from the proposal would be likely to oppose it. A 50-50
allocation of the tax base (i.e., the premium paid) between the state of the insured and the
state of the insurer accordingly might be politically more feasible. 49 The states would
determine their own tax rates. Under this approach, states have an incentive to compete
because they lose tax revenue if their insurers either charter elsewhere or lose market
share from operating under inefficient regulation. However, even the least competitive
states would not lose all tax revenues because they would share the tax revenues earned
from firms chartered in the dominant states.
A potential problem with this approach is that a sudden shift to the new regime
could benefit the states that are in position to gear up for competition most quickly. Firstmover advantages may stunt the development of vibrant jurisdictional competition. The
problem might be mitigated by phasing in the allocation. For example, under a six-year
phase-in, the split would go from 100-0, 90-10, 80-20, 70-30, 60-40, to 50-50 in the sixth
year.
It is difficult to predict the type of market that would evolve. States with smaller
markets might have a stronger incentive to specialize in the market for insurance
regulation because their potential payoff is a larger share of total tax revenues than for
smaller states. On the other hand, states where major insurance companies are
headquartered may take the lead in order to capture an incumbent advantage. The
jurisdictional competition under a single-license approach might lead to overall lower
insurance rates as dominant states have an incentive to attract firms by reducing their
chartering firms' operating costs.
C. MARKET-BASED SOLVENCY STANDARDS
As discussed in Part I, a key aspect of state insurance regulation is setting
solvency standards that ensure that insurers can pay insured claims. Part II shows that the
credibility of solvency regulation is bolstered to some extent by the "warranty" states
effectively provide through their guaranty funds. These funds help ensure that states will
not force rates so low that they do not cover risks. The problem here, and an impetus
toward increase federalization, is the concern that state guaranty funds may not be
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See David A. Hyman, Health Insurance: Market Failure or Government Failure? U Illinois
Law & Economics Research Paper No. LE08-003, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1087830 Note that
while the premia would be allocated, the states determine the tax rate on these premia.
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adequate. Yet as discussed above, 50 allowing optional federal chartering would
effectively federalize solvency regulation through the creation of a federal guaranty fund.
One approach to solving the problems of regulating solvency without excessive
federalization is to use market-based solvency measures. States could continue to
regulate solvency, as they have done, 51 under the law of the chartering state. States that
wanted to provide more protection for local consumers could do so by requiring both
local chartered and out-of-state chartered firms to have a minimum market rating.
Higher-rated firms would presumably charge more for equivalent coverage. Each state's
voters could decide how much risk they want to be allowed to take. Moreover, to the
extent that state rate regulation increases default risk, this would be reflected in ratings.
This system would permit competition and experimentation. Because it relies on the
outputs of regulation – that is, the observed financial safety of companies – rather than
less observable regulatory inputs, consumers have less need for a backup guaranty fund,
whether provided at the state or federal level.
An alternative mechanism that would provide safety comparable to state funds
without federalization would be federal regulation that requires insurers to issue solvency
bonds that default if the state guaranty fund fails. The yield on these bonds would reflect
the dispersed information available in the market rather than investigation by individual
bond rating agencies. These information sensitive bonds would provide a market-based
monitoring mechanism that would be independent of rating agencies and free from
political influence. A state's temptation to regulate rates or lower solvency standards
would be disciplined by the increase in the cost of the bond for firms chartered in the
state. Firms would avoid states whose charters increase the cost of the bond, thereby
removing states' incentives to race to the bottom by under-regulating solvency.
D. CHOICE OF CONSUMER PROTECTION LAW
The single-license solution ultimately provides consumer protection through
nationwide rate competition, incentives and ability to offer new products, and increased
information in national advertising. However, markets do not operate perfectly, and
consumers may look to their home state insurance regulators for help.
The consumer protection function of state insurance regulation is the biggest
problem for state-based regulation where policies are sold in interstate markets. A single
license could enable out of state insurers to evade the consumer protection laws in states
where insureds reside. Imposing residence-state regulations raises the specter of burden
insurers with multiple regulations as under current law. On the other hand, concerns
about a regulatory race-to-the-bottom, whether or not realistic, 52 make a single-license
model a political non-starter unless it gives states some opportunity to protect their
residents. This, of course, is also a problem with OFC proposals: the fact that the single
regulator is the federal government will not eliminate calls for an additional layer of state
protection.
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One possible approach to the risk of laxity would be to protect consumers and
preserve state regulatory authority through a federal law that permits single-license
companies to be regulated under the law of their chartering jurisdiction but only if they
clearly disclose to consumers whether they comply with local state law. Consumers could
then choose between "state approved" and "state unapproved" systems. This compromise
is unlikely to assuage proponents of state regulation, who will argue that the whole point
of state regulation is to protect consumers who may not be able fully to evaluate the risks
of regulatory competition. Moreover, this system would add little to what the market
could do on its own – i.e., disclosure of private industry certification, as by some NAICtype body. Indeed, the applicable state standards probably would be written by the
NAIC.
A superior solution would be a federal contractual choice of law statute. Under
our proposed statute, the state law designated in the insurance policy would apply to all
matters concerning the application and validity of the insurance policy. The insurer could
designate the consumer protection law of any state, including but not limited to the
chartering (licensing) state. However, the regulation of a state in which the policies are
sold could trump the designated state law if the regulating state explicitly prohibits
enforcement of the choice-of-law clause. 53
This proposal builds on the positive structure of jurisdictional competition and
choice of law as observed in many areas of the law. 54 Even in the absence of a federal
push, the states have broadly enforced contractual choice of law. For example, the
development of the internal affairs doctrine in corporate law proceeded spontaneously
and without any special help from federal law. 55 States enforce contractual choice of law
even though this tends to undercut their own regulatory efforts because if they do not do
so firms can take their business to other states or turn to Congress for help. The problem
with this system is that it tends to work slowly and imperfectly. Our proposed federal
statute will give the system a nudge in the general direction it is likely to go on its own.
The proposed statute's general default rule calling for enforcement of choice-oflaw clauses would enable companies to choose the single law that best suits their business
and to have that law govern its policies wherever they do business. Because the chosen
law need not be the chartering state, insurers can "unbundle" their regulatory preferences
and charter in states that are good at financial regulation while choosing to have their
policies governed by states that are good at consumer regulation. This addresses the
problem of national firms facing 51 different regulatory regimes. The likely result is that
one or a couple of jurisdictions will have the incentive to invest in developing efficient
regulatory regimes – perhaps Connecticut, which already has a significant investment in
regulating insurers and hedge funds.
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The proposed approach also addresses consumer groups' concerns with a potential
regulatory race to the bottom by permitting state override of contractual choice of law.
At the same time, our approach includes several significant conditions designed to protect
insurers from excessively burdensome multiple state regulation: (1) any state override
must be by the legislature; (2) the override only applies if enacted in a state where
policies are sold; (3) the override is effective only as to policies sold after the legislation
is enacted; and (4) the insurer has a clear right to exit the state. 56
The requirement of enactment by the legislature serves two purposes. First, it
gives insurers certainty and ex ante predictability. Insurers will know before selling
policies in a particular state whether their chosen law will apply, rather than having to
wait for a judicial determination of the effect of the state on choice-of-law contracts
under vague choice-of-law rules. 57 Second, it provides an implicit political check on
state incentives to override contractual choice of law. An interest group that seeks to
regulate insurance policies in the state must bear the burden of getting political support
not only for the regulation itself, but also for invalidating attempted avoidance of the
regulation through contractual choice of law. This forces the full effect of the law to the
enactment stage rather than deferring some of it to the judicial level when courts
adjudicate validity of choice-of-law clauses.
The stipulations that state override applies only to policies sold in the regulating
state after the passage of the regulation and ensuring insurers' right to exit maximize
insurers' ability to avoid oppressive state laws. This raises the political ante for proregulatory interest groups because exit can impose costs on local consumers and others.
Legislatures would have to take into account at the time of enactment lobbying not only
by the insurers that would be subject to the regulation, but also by consumers and others
who would be hurt if firms left the state in order to avoid the law.
In general, all of the relevant parties may be willing to accept the equilibrium that
is likely to prevail under our proposed law. States may be able to live with a regime in
which some can compete to become dominant regulators while others retain a limited
ability to impose their own rules. Consumer groups retain the ability they currently have
to lobby at the state level. And multi-state insurers would face a reduced risk of multiple
state regulations that would probably approximate what they should expect to have to
deal with under optional federal chartering.

IV. THE ROLE OF FEDERAL REGULATION
The single-license proposal outlined in Part III would preserve the central state
role in insurance regulation, while addressing the problem under current state law of
exposing insurers to multiple regulators. The federal government's main role in our
approach is as a sort of traffic cop – that is, enacting the necessary structural groundwork
to ensure that states enforce the sole licensing state's law except in specific circumstances
specified in the statute.

56 On the problems caused by exit restrictions, see Epstein, supra note 21, and the recent history
of Mississippi, supra note 22.
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This Part considers what, if any, additional role the federal government should
play in enacting and enforcing substantive regulation. Subpart A discusses the main
arguments for federal regulation. Subparts B and C discuss specific types of federal
regulation that might respond to these concerns. We emphasize the problem of designing
such regulation to deal with the potential problems of single licensing without
undermining the advantages of regulatory competition.
A. THE CASE FOR FEDERAL LAW
Critics of our single-license approach are likely to raise two general types of
objections. First, consumer advocates may argue that legislators and regulators would try
to attract insurers, and the tax revenues they bring with them, by promising not to
regulate strictly. This "race-to-the-bottom" would destabilize insurance guaranty funds
and put consumers at risk. Second, insurers may fear that our proposed qualifications on
single licensing would leave the door open for continued aggressive regulation by
multiple state regulators. The following sections address these issues.
1. Race to the bottom
The appropriate starting point in addressing the race-to-the-bottom argument is
whether the risk of such a race is greater for insurance regulation than for corporate law,
which provides the model for state chartering. Corporate legal scholarship has generally
supported the conclusion that the competition between the chartering states benefits
shareholders. 58 Do the same considerations apply to single-state licensing of insurers?
One might argue that the corporate internal affairs doctrine (IAD), which is the
basis of state competition in corporate law, is stable precisely because it does not attempt
to invade traditional areas of state regulation. 59 The IAD is fairly narrow, and excludes
controversial aspects of regulating corporations, such as securities fraud and disclosure,
antitrust law, bankruptcy and myriad types of corporate conduct, for treatment by federal
law or state law that is not within the IAD. The corporate law market relates only to
substantive corporate governance. In public corporations these are standard rules which
are priced fairly accurately in efficient stock markets, while in closely held firms they are
subject to negotiation by engaged business people. The IAD's triviality may partly
explain why Congress has not preempted the field, though it clearly has the power to do
so.
Insurance regulation arguably bears a closer resemblance to traditional consumer
protection law, and therefore is likely to trigger much stronger objections to applying
firms' chosen state law. There are, however, reasons for skepticism about the fear of race
to the bottom in insurance regulation through primary state regulation. Even in such
areas as environmental regulation, there are theoretical and empirical questions about the
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validity of the race to the bottom story.60 With respect to insurance regulation, as already
noted, 61 even unsophisticated consumers are protected by robust markets.
Moreover, state regulation in the absence of choice of law has not necessarily
protected consumers. For example, it took Eliot Spitzer to react to existing problems of
broker contingent compensation. Some would say that Spitzer overreacted, but the fact
would remain that there was a problem that dispersed state regulators had not
addressed. 62 By contrast, recognizing a clear default rule of enforcement of choice of
licensing jurisdiction is likely to induce some states to invest in developing a reputation
for prudent insurance regulation. This may result in greater consumer protection than
under the current regime of dispersed regulators, thereby reducing states' incentives to
override contractual choice. For example, Vermont has maintained a dominant role as the
jurisdiction of choice for captive insurers, not through laxity, but in part by maintaining a
reputation for stringent financial integrity regulation that has kept the liquidation rate of
Vermont associations lower than that of other states. 63
Thus, single-state licensing not only promises to reduce regulatory costs, but also
to produce more efficient and effective regulation. But despite these arguments against
the "race-to-the-bottom" objection, we have attempted to mitigate this risk through
federal market-based constraints on solvency regulation 64 and by allowing for limited
state override of the licensing state to protect consumers. 65 Particularly with these
safeguards in place, extensive federal regulation of insurance is unnecessary. The modest
proposals in subparts B and C are intended to fill any remaining gap in protection without
opening the door too wide for federal regulation to supplant state competition.
2. Excessive state regulation
Insurers may object that the limitations we propose on state competition raise the
problem that aggressive state legislatures may take advantage of their power to override
the single license and impose multiple regulatory burdens on insurers. However, it is
important to keep in mind that would-be regulators are subject to the significant risk that
insurers will respond by lobbying Congress for a federal insurance law that would
preempt state regulation. State regulation, particularly of a national industry like
insurance, always exists in the shadow of potential federal law. To minimize the risk of
being supplanted by federal law, states may either refrain from regulating except to fight
60 See Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the “Race-to-theBottom” Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1210 (1992); Henry N. Butler
and Jonathan R. Macey, USING FEDERALISM TO IMPROVE ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY (AEI
Press, 1996); ENVIRONMENTAL FEDERALISM (Terry L. Anderson and P.J. Hill, eds. 1997); Jonathan
H. Adler, Judicial Federalism and the Future of Federal Environmental Regulation, 90 IOWA L. REV.
377 (2005).
61
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the clearest abuses, or opt for uniform state laws through the NAIC that at least reduce
the risk of duplicative and opportunistic regulation.
Given the persisting risk of federal regulation, our single-license approach could
be viewed as a kind of trial run for state law. The states have been the exclusive
insurance regulators for sixty years. The problems of state regulation have led to loud
calls for federal regulation from both consumers and insurers. We argue in this paper for
rehabilitation of state regulation by opening this regulation to jurisdictional competition.
But if this rehabilitation does not work, state regulators understand that the calls for
federal regulation may become politically irresistible.
Insurers may respond that the political costs and risks of dismantling the state
competition regime diminish any disciplinary effect of potential federal regulation. This
suggests that it may be appropriate to establish a federal regulatory structure that would
be ready to step in if needed without having to do a full-fledged overhaul of the existing
regime. The proposals in subparts B and C, below, might serve this function in addition
to addressing potential for a race-to-the-bottom.
B. OFFICE OF NATIONAL INSURANCE
Secretary Paulson's Treasury Plan calls for the creation of a specialized federal
office to monitor insurance markets. 66 The proposed Office of National Insurance could
play an important role in our single-license scheme of collecting, disseminating, and
analyzing information about the effectiveness of state jurisdictional competition. The data
would indicate if state regulation has been too lax or if states are imposing excessive
regulatory burdens on insurers.
In order to increase the disciplinary effect of the federal insurance office, the
office could be empowered to impose specified types of regulation and preempt state law
if it makes the requisite findings. This would move the federal preemption threat from
the background to a foreground concern for lax or aggressive state regulators. This is
comparable to the Securities and Exchange Commission's power to supplement or
preempt state corporate law under its general authority to regulate national securities
markets.
The obvious problem with establishing this federal mechanism is the pervasive
concern that such an agency will succumb to the well-known bureaucratic tendencies to
expand its mission and authority. In order to deal with this problem, the agency's power
needs to be carefully circumscribed and the conditions of its intervention need to be
described as precisely as possible.
The national insurance office would have the additional function and benefit of
better enabling U.S. insurers to enter foreign markets. Critics of state law have suggested
that U.S. insurers are at a competitive disadvantage in attempting to enter foreign markets
because it is hard for dispersed state regulators to offer reciprocal privileges to foreign
insurers entering the U.S. This problem would be alleviated under our approach because
the foreign insurer would only have to obtain a single license. However, the problem
would continue to some extent because no one regulator would represent U.S. interests in
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international negotiations. The proposed national insurance office could not only be a
way to clarify the state licensing alternatives available to foreign entrants, but a
mechanism for negotiating international treaties.
C. TRULY OPTIONAL FEDERAL CHARTERING
Lax or aggressive state regulators might be disciplined not only by the threat of
federal regulation, but also by offering insurers the additional choice of a federal charter.
As discussed in subpart II.B., the current proposal for optional federal chartering does not
offer a true option for several reasons: insurers' only other choice is continued exposure
to regulation in each state in which they sell insurance; the federal government is likely to
be able to back up its regulation with a better solvency guaranty fund than any state
regulator; and the federal government would be able to quickly offer higher quality
regulation than what any state has developed under the weak incentives of the current
state regulatory system. The single-license proposal would give states a competitive
incentive to offer superior regulation, thereby arguably making optional federal
chartering unnecessary.
Although optional federal chartering may be unnecessary under a favorable view
of state competition, it offers a potential alternative for insurers or consumer groups that
object to our single-license alternative. It is important to emphasize that we are referring
to truly optional chartering, in which the federal charter competes on a level playing field
with state chartering.
Leveling the playing field would involve not only offering the possibility of a
single state license, but also giving the states the opportunity to develop viable regulation
under competition before the federal government can enter the competition. Making the
federal option available immediately may stifle the development of jurisdictional
competition by the states. Accordingly, we suggest making the federal charter available
after a reasonable transition period of five years or so. An alternative would be to
empower the national insurance office proposed above to recommend the desirability or
need for a federal charter option after five years experience under our single-license
approach.
Truly optional federal chartering could be designed to address both of the
problems with single licensing identified in subpart A. Federal chartering might deal
with the problem of multiple state regulators overriding chartering state law by providing
that the federal charter preempts state consumer protection regulation. Preemption is
arguably justified on the basis that the federal government has less revenue incentive than
a small state to race-to-the-bottom to attract chartering business.
Federal chartering also could address state laxity by providing a superior guaranty
fund as a "warranty" to back solvency and rate regulation. This would not only protect
consumers, but also could attract chartering business from insurers. Insurers could decide
whether they want the most efficient state regulation that has developed under singlelicense competition, backed by the market-based solvency protection, 67 or to offer their
customers the security of a federal guaranty, presumably at a higher price.
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It is important, however, to keep in mind the caveat that the federal option always
has the potential to overwhelm even efficient state competitors, resulting in a noncompetitive system with a single federal regulator.68 Because of this danger, federal
chartering should be made available only if there is a preliminary finding by Congress or
the national insurance office that there are defects in the competitive single-license state
system.

V. CONCLUSION
All proposals to federalize insurance regulation – whether through mandatory or
optional federal laws – create opportunities for abuse at the hands of the federal
government. Monopoly national regulation of the insurance industry should be viewed
with skepticism by both industry and consumers. Insurance carriers could be subject to
rent extraction by the federal regulator, while consumers should be concerned about
industry capture of the centralized regulatory agency. This article proposes a state-based
regime that both protects insurers from the worst effects of multiple regulators and
creates a real opportunity for jurisdictional competition and experimentation. To be sure,
a state-based regime is not perfect. But a single federal regime also has serious potential
drawbacks, particularly including the absence of a mechanism to correct its errors. We
have proposed a set of checks and balances to help protect against the potential
malfunctioning of the state system. There is no guarantee that state competition is a
panacea. But given the strong potential benefits of state competition under our singlelicense approach, it is certainly worth trying before scrapping state law in favor of a
single federal regulator.

68 For a discussion of the Canadian experience with an optional federal corporation law, see
Ronald J. Daniels, Should Provinces Compete? The Case for a Competitive Corporate Law Market, 36
MCGILL L.J. 130 (1991) (noting dysfunctions that can arise in competition between federal and state
chartering jurisdictions).
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